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LONGER WORKING HOURS –
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW
TREND?*
A number of company-level agreements on longer
working hours have recently been concluded in
Germany. Such deals, for example, at Siemens and
DaimlerChrysler have been widely publicised. The
increases in working time have taken place without –
or with only partial – pay compensation and thus rep-
resent cuts in hourly wages. They have in many cases
occurred in response to employer threats of outsourc-
ing production to lower-cost facilities abroad.
The working-time agreements in Germany have pro-
voked a lot of debate, not only in that country but
also in France as well as in other Western European
countries. A key question is whether the German
agreements imply a reversal of the earlier trend
towards shorter hours that could spread to other
countries as well. Potentially, this could happen both
via psychological demonstration effects and via direct
competitive pressures as production sites in different
countries compete for jobs. 
A controversial issue concerns the effects of longer
working hours on jobs. It has been claimed both that
a lengthening of working hours will raise employment
and that it will reduce it. A relat-
ed issue is whether or not an
increase in working time will be
an effective way of counteracting
the future tendencies to falling
labour supply in the ageing
European societies (see Chapter
4 of this report).
This chapter analyses both the
causes and the consequences of
the recent working-time agree-
ments in Germany. The aim is to
align the discussion better with
available research than has so far
been done. 
1. Background
Recent research on income differences among coun-
tries has shown that the main factor behind the high-
er income per capita in the US than in Western
Europe is higher labour input, not higher productivi-
ty (Gordon 2002, OECD 2003, Blanchard 2004). This
is illustrated by Table 1. Whereas GDP per hour
worked in the EU-15 was 90 percent of the US level in
2002, the number of hours worked per capita in the
EU-15 was only 79 percent of that in the US. The dif-
ference in income between the US and Western
Europe was more or less unchanged between 1970
and 2002: GDP per capita in the EU-15 was about
70 percent of the level in the US in both years. The
unchanged income differential, however, masks two
offsetting developments. Over the 1970–2002 period,
labour productivity in Europe increased relative to
that in the US, reflecting considerably faster produc-
Table 3.1
Real income, labour productivity, and labour input in
EU-15 in per cent of USlevels
1970 2002







Source: Eurostat Structural Indicators (2004).
* We are grateful for comments on this
chapter from Bertil Holmlund, Ann-Sofie
Kolm, and Oskar Nordström Skans.
Figure 3.1tivity growth up until the mid-1990s and somewhat
slower growth after that. In contrast, hours worked
per capita fell continuously in Europe relative to the
US.
1.1. Working time in different countries
Figure 3.1 illustrates the differences in working time
per capita among the OECD countries. The number
of annual hours worked per capita is particularly low
in some of the continental Western European coun-
tries (France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Germany) as well as in Hungary and Norway.
Figure 3.2 decomposes the differences in hours worked
per capita among OECD countries into: (1) differences
in hours per employee; (2) differences in the employ-
ment rate (the ratio of employment to working-age
population); and (3) differences in demography (the
ratio of working-age population to total population).
A low number of working hours per employee is the
most important factor behind the low number of work-
ing hours per capita in most of the European countries
at the bottom of the diagram (France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany and Norway). 
Figure 3.3 shows that hours per capita over the whole
1970–2002 period have declined in all OECD coun-
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tries except the US, New Zealand, Canada, Iceland
and Australia. Over the same period, hours per
employee have fallen everywhere. The reductions have,
however, been much larger in Western Europe than in
the US (particularly so in Germany, the Netherlands,
Ireland, Norway, France, Denmark Spain, Belgium,
Switzerland, Denmark, and Italy). Most of the reduc-
tions in both hours per capita and hours per employ-
ee took place in the 1970–1990 period. Working hours
per capita actually rose in about half the OECD coun-
tries in the 1990–2002 period, mainly because of ris-
ing employment rates. Working hours per employee
continued to fall in most European countries but at a
slower pace than before.
Actual hours worked per employee depend to a large
extent on the incidence of part-time work, which we
shall not discuss here.1 It is clear, however, that low
standard working time for full-timers is an important
explanation for the low working
hours per employee in some
Western European countries.
This is illustrated in Table 3.2.
Whereas annual standard work-
ing time for a full-time worker in
2003 was around 1900 hours in
the US and around 1800 as an
average in the new EU member
states, the EU-15 average is only
1700 hours. The countries with
the lowest annual standard work-
ing hours are France (1568),
Denmark (1613), the Nether-
lands (1648), and (west) Ger-
many (1648). As can be seen, the
low annual standard working
time in these countries reflects a
short working week.
In general, actual working time
exceeds standard working time.
One reason is the existence of
both paid and unpaid overtime.
Another reason, when working
time is determined through collec-
tive agreements, is that not all
firms are covered by such agree-
ments and that working time
tends to be longer in non-covered
firms. The average actual as well
as standard weekly hours for a
number of Western European
countries are shown in Table 3.3.2
The UK shows the largest discrep-
ancy between the two measures with actual weekly
working time exceeding standard working time by as
much as 6.1 hours, but there are sizable differences in
Germany (2.5 hours), France (2 hours), the
Netherlands (1.9 hours) and Spain (1.9 hours) as well.
Countries with shorter standard hours tend to have
larger differences between actual and standard hours.
A similar pattern appears to exist also within countries,
with, for example, a larger discrepancy between actual
and standard hours in Germany in the metal and engi-
neering sector, which has the shortest standard work-
ing time, than in other sectors (Lehndorff 2004).
1 An increase in the incidence of part-time work can be associated
with both rises and falls in working hours per capita. It will be asso-
ciated with a fall if the employment rate is constant, but more
employees choose – or are forced to choose – part-time instead of
full-time work. It will be associated with a rise if it reflects an
increase in labour market flexibility leading to a higher employment
rate among the population.
2 The table refers to 2002, which is the latest year for which we have
data on actual working time.
Figure 3.3Reductions in standard working
time took place in a number of
European countries in the 1980s
and 1990s through either collec-
tive agreements or legislation.
Table 3.4 gives an overview of cuts
in the standard working week.
The most far-reaching reductions
took place in Germany and
France. In Germany, the standard
working week in the metal work-
ing and engineering industry was
reduced from 40 to 35 hours in a
series of collective agreements
between 1984 and 1995. Working
time reductions occurred also in
most other sectors. In France,
there were legislated cuts in the
working week in 1982 (from 40 to
39 hours) and then again in 2000
and 2002 (from 39 to 35 hours).
Cuts in the standard working
week have also taken place in
Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Greece, Hungary, the Nether-
lands, Norway and the UK. 
1.2 Theoretical considerations
The differences in working time
developments between Western
Europe and the US over recent
decades have initiated a lively
research discussion. Basically,
three types of theoretical expla-
nations for these differences have
been put forward.
• Differences in preferences. For
example, Blanchard (2004)
argues that the most impor-
tant cause of the differences in
the development in working
hours between Western
Europe and the US are basic
differences in the preferences
regarding labour and leisure.
According to this interpreta-
tion, Europeans have a
stronger preference for shorter
working hours than
Americans. This view has




Standard working time for full-time workers according to collective










a) 1904 40.0 -
Estonia 1840 40.0 -
Hungary 1840 40.0 40.0
Latvia 1840 40.0 -
Poland 1840 40.0 -
Slovenia 1816 40.0 40.0
Japan
a) 1803 39.2 -




Greece 1800 40.0 40.0
Malta 1776 40.0 -
Belgium 1748 38.0 38.0
Portugal 1748 39.0 40.0
Slovakia 1748 38.5 37.5
Germany (east) 1730 39.1 38.0
Spain 1729 38.6 38.5
Luxembourg 1728 39.0 39.0
Austria 1717 38.5 38.5
Cyprus 1710 38.0 38.0
EU-15 1700 38.1 37.9
UK 1693 37.2 37.3
Sweden 1676 38.8 40.0
Finland 1673 37.5 36.5
Italy 1672 38.0 39.1
Germany (west) 1648 37.4 35.0
Netherlands 1648 37.0 35.2
Denmark 1613 37.0 37.0
France 1568 35.0 35.0
Note:
a)The figure refers to 2002.
Source: All countries except Japan and the US: Working Time Developments
(2003), EIROnline;
Japan and the US: Deutschland in Zahlen (2004), Institut der Wirtschaft,
Cologne
Table 3.3










UK 43.3 37.2 6.1
Greece 41.0 40.0 1.0
Spain 40.4 38.5 1.9
Portugal 40.3 39.0 1.3
Austria 40.1 38.5 1.6
EU-15 40.0 38.5 1.5
Sweden 39.9 38.8 1.1
Germany 39.9 37.4 2.5
Ireland 39.5 39.0 0.5
Luxembourg 39.5 39.0 0.5
Belgium 39.3 38.5 0.8
Finland 39.2 39.3 -0.1
Denmark 39.1 39.0 0.1
Netherlands 38.9 37.0 1.9
Italy 38.5 38.0 0.5
France 37.7 35.7 2.0
Source: Actual working time: European Labour Force Survey (2002); Standard
working time: Working-Time Developments (2003), EIROnline.EEAG Report 55
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survey studies of employee
attitudes towards changes in
working time (see Bell and
Freeman 1994 and OECD
1998). 
• Higher tax wedges in Europe.
An alternative explanation
focuses instead on the differ-
ences in tax wedges between
Western Europe and the US.
Labour taxes are higher and
have risen by more in Europe
than in the US over the last
three decades. In a calibrated
model of the labour-leisure
choices of households, Pres-
cott (2004) finds that the
whole difference in the devel-
opment of working hours per
capita between a number of
large European countries and
the US can be explained by
the differential development
of labour taxes. Olovsson
(2004) obtains similar results
for Sweden: focusing on
households’ choices between
market work and “home pro-
duction”, he is able to explain
all of the difference in work-
ing hours to the US with the
higher Swedish tax wedges.
These results are not undis-
puted however. Econometric
estimates on panel data usual-
ly attribute a much smaller
role to taxes in explaining the
fall in hours per capita in
Europe (Nickell 2003).
• Higher coverage of collective
agreements in Europe. A third
possible explanation is the
higher degree of unionisation
and the larger role for collec-
tive agreements in Europe
than in the US (see Chapter 3
of the 2004 EEAG report).
Reductions in working time
are a common objective of
trade unions. Cuts in working
hours can be viewed as a way
of raising wages by restricting
labour supply. They can also
Table 3.4   
Major reductions in the standard workweek in European economies,
1980–2004 
Year Change Legislation Collective Agreements
Austria 1990 40  38,5 x
Belgium
b) 1999 40  39 x
x (inter-industry
agreement)
  2003 39  38 x
x (inter-industry
agreement)
Denmark 1987 39  37 x (70% of employees)
France 1982 40  39
2000 39  35 x (large firms)
2002 39  35 x (all firms)
Germany
a
) 1984 40  38.5
x (metal working and
engineering)
1987 38.5  37.5
x (metal working and
engineering)
1989 37.5  37
x (metal working and
engineering)
1993 37  36
x (metal working and
engineering)
1995 36  35
x (metal working and
engineering)
Greece
1980 45  43 x
1981 43  42 x
1983 42  40 x
Hungary 2003 40  38 x






1982 40  38 x (Waasenaar
agreement)




Norway 1987 40  37,5
x (blue-collar-workers 
in manufacturing)
UK 1979 40  39 x (engineering)




a) Working time reductions also occurred in other sectors than in the
metal and engineering sector during the 1984–98 period, but are not shown in
the table.
b) The entries in the table represent inter-industry agreements
involving the government, which have been codified into law. The  inter-
industry agreements, have, however, only confirmed earlier concluded
collective agreements at the sectoral level. For example, the reductionin the 
standard work week from 40 to 39 hours in such sectoral agreements took
place mainly in1980/81.





http://www.issa.int/pdf/jeru98/theme2/2-1b.pdfbe seen as a method of distributing the unemploy-
ment following from wages above the market-clear-
ing level more evenly among workers. Indeed, ideas
of work sharing have been an important factor
behind the working time reductions in continental
European countries. There is also empirical
research (from the US) showing that a higher cov-
erage of collective agreements co-varies with short-
er standard working hours (Earle and Pencavel
1990). This finding is consistent with a positive
correlation among countries between, on the one
hand, the working time reductions that took place
in the 1980s and early 1990s and, on the other,
union density and the coverage of collective bar-
gaining (OECD 1998). Recent observations from
Germany also show that weekly working time has
increased in firms that have withdrawn from
employers’ associations relative to firms that con-
tinue to be covered by a collective agreement
(Kölling and Lehmann 2002).
2. The driving forces behind recent deals on longer
working time
In 2004, several widely publicised agreements on
longer working hours were concluded in large Ger-
man companies. These deals followed a debate trig-
gered by the Ifo Institute (Sinn 2003a, 2003b).3 An
agreement at Siemens (involving two mobile phone
plants) raised standard weekly hours from 35 to
40 hours without pay compensation. At Daimler
Chrysler there was an agreement (involving one car
plant) to gradually raise the weekly working time
from 35 to 39 hours without pay compensation for
some workers and to increase the threshold at which
overtime premia start to be paid.  Another deal,
encompassing all Volkswagen plants in Germany,
included, beside a wage freeze, both a rise in the stan-
dard working time by 1.5 hours without pay compen-
sation (but with deferred compensation in terms of
enhanced possibilities to retire earlier) and an effec-
tive reduction of the threshold at which overtime pre-
mia are paid. Agreements on longer working hours
have also been concluded at, for example, the truck
manufacturer MAN, the Thomas Cook tourist group,
Lufthansa, and many small and medium-sized firms.4
The state governments in Bavaria and Hessen have
increased the weekly working time for civil servants
and discussions on similar increases are also taking
place in other states.
The company-level agreements on longer working
hours that have been concluded in the German metal
working and engineering sectors were made possible
by an opt-out clause in the latest industry collective
agreement. The clause allows plant-level deals that
deviate from the sectoral agreement on working hours
in certain cases in order to safeguard jobs (Münchau
2004, EIROnline 2004). In line with this, several of the
deals on longer working hours have also contained
explicit employment guarantees on the part of firms
and sometimes also commitments to invest in the
existing production facilities.
The recent agreements in Germany have intensified
the debate on working time in that country as well as
in other European countries. It appears, however, that
the discrepancy between actual and collectively
agreed working hours in western Germany widened
already in the second half of the 1990s. This is likely
to have been the consequence of increases in working
time both in firms leaving employers’associations and
in firms encompassed by sectoral collective agree-
ments but entering into deals with their employees in
violation of these agreements (Lehndorff 2004;
Zimmermann 2004).
The deals to lengthen working time are a response to
pressures to reduce labour costs. High unemployment
and international competitive pressures have, for a
long time, exerted such pressures. The new feature is
that employees are, to a larger extent than before,
exposed to credible threats from employers that pro-
duction sites will be closed down and jobs outsourced
abroad, either to the new EU countries or elsewhere.
This is a reflection of the ongoing “globalisation”,
which has progressively lowered the obstacles to inter-
national capital mobility (see the discussion in
Chapter 2 of this report). The enlargement of the EU
may represent a “discontinuous jump” in this direc-
tion: by increasing access to EU-15 product markets
as well as promoting a more stable institutional
framework, the expected returns to investment in the
new EU states have increased and the risks associated
with such investment decreased.
Against this background, there are two useful – and
complementary – ways of viewing the company-level
agreements on longer working hours in Germany: (1)
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3 See also a sizeable number of Ifo newspaper interviews on this issue
as recorded on www.ifo.de.
4 An agreement on an increase in working time without pay com-
pensation was also concluded in 2004 at the German-owned Bosch
factory in Venissieux in France. Currently, longer working hours are
being discussed as a cost-cutting measure at the German Opel facto-
ry in Rüsselsheim, which is competing within the GM concern with
the Swedish Saab factory in Trollhättan about future car production.EEAG Report 57
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as a convenient way of reducing hourly wage costs;
and (2) as an induced labour supply response to a
reduction of the hourly wage. 
2.1 Company deals on longer working hours as a way of
cutting labour costs
Both real and nominal wages tend to be rigid down-
wards. Most employees are likely to resist cuts in real
wages that endanger the consumption standards to
which they are accustomed. The resistance to real pay
cuts through reductions in nominal pay may be even
greater, because psychological self-esteem of employ-
ees often seems to be linked more to nominal rather
than real pay (Bewley 1999). 
A lengthening of working time without pay compen-
sation can obviously be a convenient way of reducing
hourly wages, since it leaves the total pay per employ-
ee unchanged. No reduction in real consumption
standards is then required. Nor has the nominal wage
income per employee to be reduced. The option of
reducing hourly wage costs through an increase in
working time is likely to be seen as more favourable
the shorter the working time is to start with, as mar-
ginal disutility of work is then lower. From this point
of view it is logical that it is in Germany that working
time increases have occurred.
Increases in working time at unchanged pay can give
rise to very substantial cuts in hourly wages. For
example, an increase in weekly hours from 35 to
40 hours represents a reduction of hourly wages by as
much as 12.5 percent. An increase from 35 to 37 hours
represents a reduction by 5.4 percent.
It is natural that the agreements to cut labour costs
through longer working hours have come about at the
company rather than the sectoral level. There are well-
known obstacles to wage moderation at the latter
level. Most union members in a sector will be
employed “insiders”, whose jobs are not threatened.
Hence, the majority of union members in a sector will
be unwilling to concede across-the-board wage cuts in
order to preserve threatened jobs in some firms or cre-
ate new ones for the unemployed (which is a process
that will take time and where the future winners can-
not be identified ex ante).5 The incentives for wage
moderation are, of course, much stronger at an indi-
vidual production site that the employer threatens to
close down: then all the employees can be identified as
“winners” already in the short run. For this reason,
concession bargaining resulting in wage cuts in order
to preserve existing jobs typically take place at the
company level.
Chapter 3 of last year’s EEAG report pointed to the
strong decentralisation forces set in motion by
increased international competition. Employers in
Western Europe used to be favourable to industry-
level collective bargaining because it provided them
with a level playing field, eliminating domestic com-
petition in terms of wages. But this attitude reflected
a situation where the bulk of competition was domes-
tic. When competition instead is mainly international,
the uniformity of national sectoral collective agree-
ments prevents adjustment of wage costs to the spe-
cific competitive situation of the individual firm. One
way of viewing the company-level agreements on
working time (as well as other cost-cutting measures)
is therefore as a kind of “decentralisation revolt”from
below. 
The agreements on working time at, for example,
Siemens, DaimlerChrysler, and Volkswagen, have all
included some form of employment guarantee from
the employer. It is well-known from the theory of col-
lective bargaining that bargaining between employers
and unions over both wages and employment leads in
general to more efficient outcomes (with higher
employment) than bargaining only over wages
(McDonald and Solow 1981; Layard, Nickell and
Jackman 1991). The explanation is that simultaneous
bargaining about both wages and employment allows
greater possibilities of trading off wage restraint
against higher employment. Centralised bargaining at
the sectoral (or multi-sectoral) level is not consistent
with such efficient bargaining over both wages and
employment, since it would require mechanisms,
which do not exist, for allocating the aggregate
employment agreed at the centralised level among
firms. This is the reason why such wage-employment
deals are observed only at the level of the firm.
2.2 Longer working hours as a labour supply response
to a real wage reduction 
A complementary way of looking at the agreements
on longer working hours is as a labour supply
response to a reduction in hourly real wages necessary
to preserve the competitiveness of domestic produc-
tion facilities.
5 These obstacles to wage moderation at the sectoral level are similar
to the political-economy obstacles to labour market reforms with the
aim of promoting wage moderation at the national level. These
obstacles were analysed in Chapter 2 of last year’s EEAG report.Standard theory tells us that we should analyse the
supply of working hours as the labour-leisure choice
of individual employees (and/or as an issue of allo-
cating time between market work and “home produc-
tion”). According to standard analysis, a cut in the
hourly wage has an income and a substitution effect.
The income effect tends to increase the number of
hours supplied, because the employee’s demand for
leisure, as well as for all other goods, tends to fall
when income is reduced.6 The substitution effect tends
to reduce hours supplied, because (market) work
becomes less attractive relative to leisure (and home
production). Theoretically, one cannot tell which
effect dominates, but empirical work suggests a small
negative net effect of wage reductions on labour sup-
ply (for prime-aged males; the effect is larger for
females).7 This is the same as saying that the labour
supply curve is weakly positively sloped, as depicted
in Figure 3.4a. According to this reasoning, one
should thus expect a fall – and not a rise – in working
hours as a response to a reduction in hourly wage
rates.
However, the conventional labour supply framework
is not the appropriate one for analysing recent
increases in working time as these have resulted from
collective, and not individual, bargaining between
employers and employees. The appropriate frame-
work is instead the theory of collective bargaining. It
is standard to use this for analysing wage setting.8
According to this framework, unions try to trade off
the benefits of real wage increases for the members
who remain employed against the utility losses for the
members that become unem-
ployed if wages are raised (too
much). The utility loss from un-
employment for a worker equals
the difference between utility
when employed (which depends
on both wage income and work-
ing time) and utility when unem-
ployed (which depends on unem-
ployment benefits).
The theory of collective bargain-
ing can also be used for analysing
working-time decisions.9 Obvi-
ously, a union, which acts in the
interest of its members, will care about the labour-
leisure trade-offs of employees. But unlike individuals
acting alone, it will also be concerned about the effect
of working-time decisions on the number of jobs: in
the jargon of economists, a union internalises the
effects of a change in working time of one union
member on other union members. To provide more
jobs (or prevent job losses), the union (workers acting
collectively) has an incentive to  restrict working time
as compared to what workers would do when acting
individually (Calmfors 1985, 1987; Holmlund 1987):
given the hourly wage, shorter working time forces
employers to satisfy their total demand for working
hours by employing more workers. The desire of
unions to hold back working time is a way of reduc-
ing the negative employment effects of wages that are
set above the market-clearing level. The union incen-
tive to restrict hours of work in order to raise employ-
ment is stronger, the more attractive it is to have a job
(that is the higher the utility associated with a job).10
According to the described theory, unions will in gen-
eral respond differently to changes in hourly real
wages than individual employees acting on their own
as regards desired working time. The ordinary income
and substitution effects that arise for employees acting
individually will also affect the desired working time
on the part of a union. But there is also an additional
effect. A cut in the hourly wage means that the attrac-




6 This assumes that leisure is a so-called “normal” good.
7 See, for example, Aronsson and Walker (1997) for a recent review
of empirical work on labour supply.
8 See, for example, Oswald (1985), Layard and Nickell (1991), Nickell
and Layard (1999), Calmfors and Holmlund (2000), or Naylor
(2003) for reviews of this literature.
9 Contributions to this literature include among others Calmfors
(1985, 1987), Holmlund (1987), Earle and Pencavel (1990), and
Booth and Ravaillon (1993).
10 Under some assumptions, legislative regulation of working time
produces similar outcomes as collective bargaining. The reason is
that employees – making up the political majority – have similar
incentives to restrict working hours when they act as voters in the
political process as when they act as members of a trade union. This
has been analysed by Marimon and Zilibotti (2000), who show that
legislation restricting working time relative to the “laissez-faire”out-
come from bargaining between firms and individual workers is in the
interest of workers.EEAG Report 59
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then tends to be associated with a lower income. This
effect weakens the incentive of a union to restrict
working hours in order to promote employment and
thus tends to counteract the ordinary substitution
effect of a wage change on working time. Therefore,
there are stronger forces working in the direction of
increasing working time when there is a cut in the
hourly wage if working time is determined in collec-
tive bargaining between unions and firms than when
it is determined in bargaining between individual
employees and firms. 
Under some theoretical assumptions – most impor-
tantly that the total number of working hours
demanded by employers depends only on the hourly
wage rate but is independent of working time per
employee11 – the change-in-the-attractiveness-of-a-
having-a-job effect on the desired working time exact-
ly offsets the ordinary substitution effect for a union
(Calmfors 1985). Hence, in such an analysis only the
income effect remains, so that a reduction in the
hourly wage must lead to an increase in working
time.12 This is equivalent to saying that the schedule
showing how the desired working time of a union
depends on the wage is negatively sloped, as shown in
Figure 3.4b.
Our theoretical reasoning provides a possible expla-
nation of the recent agreements on longer working
hours in Germany. These are then viewed as an
endogenous labour supply response in collective
agreements to a required reduction in the hourly real
wage. Provided that the hourly wage must fall, longer
working hours, which help maintain members’
incomes, are in the interest of unions.
3. The effects of working hours on employment and
output
A key issue is how agreements on longer working
hours of the type that have been concluded in
Germany affect employment and output. The views in
the public debate diverge fundamentally. Proponents
of longer working time tend to argue that more jobs
will be created, whereas opponents usually claim the
opposite. To sort out the arguments, it is important to
distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. In
a short-run analysis, one can take the reductions in
hourly wages implied by the agreements as given. In a
long-run analysis, one must consider how wage-set-
ting incentives will respond over time to longer work-
ing hours: in long-run equilibrium, aggregate employ-
ment must be such that the parties to wage bargaining
have an incentive to set wages that are consistent with
the return to capital required by the international cap-
ital market.
3.1 Short-run employment and output effects of longer
hours 
To illustrate the short-run effects of longer working
hours, it is instructive to analyse a very stylised exam-
ple. Think of a profit-maximising firm that produces
an output the price of which the firm cannot affect.
This would, for example, be the case if the firm is one
of many producers of an identical good in the world
market. To begin with, assume that the physical cap-
ital stock as well as the degree of capital utilisation in
the firm are given. Assume also that hours and work-
ers are perfect substitutes to the firm, so that it is
indifferent to whether a given output is produced by
more employees working fewer hours per employee
or by fewer employees working more hours per
employee. 
How would employment in such a firm respond to an
increase in working time at unchanged pay per work-
er, where the pay per worker is the product of the
hourly wage and the number of working hours? The
firm employs workers up to the point at which the
productivity of the marginal worker (the increase in
output from an additional worker) equals the pay of a
worker. The effect on employment of an increase in
working time at unchanged pay depends on whether
the productivity of a marginal worker rises or falls.
There are two counteracting effects. 
• On the one hand, the productivity of a marginal
worker tends to increase when he/she works more
hours. 
• On the other hand, the productivity of a marginal
worker tends to fall because longer working time
for all workers implies a lower productivity of the
marginal hour (the increase in output from an
additional hour worked). The reason is that the
productivity of the marginal hour depends posi-
tively on the ratio between capital and the total
number of hours worked (the number of workers x
11 This is equivalent to assuming that working hours and workers are
perfect substitutes (within a relevant range), so that employers are
indifferent to whether a given output is produced by fewer employ-
ees working more hours or more employees working fewer hours. See
Section 3.1 below. 
12 The implicit assumption is then again that leisure is a “normal
good”, that is a good for which demand increases when income
increases. A similar theoretical result as above holds when working
time is determined through legislation and employees make up the
political majority. See also footnote 10.working time) and that this ratio tends to fall when
working time increases.13
The net effect on the productivity of a marginal work-
er of an increase in working time depends on which of
the two effects dominates. If the productivity of a
marginal hour falls only slowly when hours increase,
the first effect dominates and the productivity of a
marginal worker increases. This makes it profitable for
the firm to increase employment. If instead the pro-
ductivity of a marginal hour falls quickly as hours
increase, the second effect dominates, so that the pro-
ductivity of a marginal worker falls and the firm
reduces employment.
What is clear, however, is that, independently of how
the number of workers is affected, output increases.
This follows because a profit-maximising firm choos-
es the total number of hours worked such that the
productivity of a marginal hour worked equals the
hourly wage. Obviously, when the hourly wage falls, it
becomes profitable for the firm to increase the total
number of hours.
Another way of thinking about the employment
effects of a lengthening of working time at unchanged
pay per worker is in terms of the wage elasticity of
labour demand (the percentage increase in the total
number of working hours demanded by the firm
when the hourly wage falls by one percent). As dis-
cussed in Box 3.1, the condition for an increase in
working time at unchanged pay per worker to raise
employment in our stylised example is that the labour
demand elasticity exceeds one (see also Sachverstän-
digenrat 2003). When the capital stock is fixed, the
labour demand elasticity equals the ratio between, on
the one hand, the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour and, on the other, the profit share
in output. Typical values for these parameters are
0.6 and 0.3, respectively, which would give a labour
demand elasticity of around two. This presupposes,
however, that the firm can restructure the given capi-
tal stock and adopt more labour-intensive production
methods. Since this may be a time-consuming process,
the elasticity is likely to be well below unity in the
short run (say within a year). This could be taken to
suggest that, in the short run, the output increase
achieved through longer working hours must be
bought at the cost of a reduction in employment. This
conclusion does not follow, however. There are two
main reasons for this. The first is that the degree of
capital utilisation is likely to increase when working
time increases. The second reason is that longer work-
ing time could affect the size of the capital stock.
Working time and the utilisation of capital
It is important to distinguish between the physical
capital stock and the capital services produced by this
physical capital stock – just as we distinguish between
the “stock” of workers employed (employment) and
the labour services produced (the total number of
hours worked). The volume of capital services
depends on the degree of utilisation of the capital
stock, that is on the length of time during which the
capital stock is operated (the operating time). It is rea-
sonable to assume that longer working time for
employees increases the operating time of capital.
This can indeed be seen as one of the major advan-
tages of longer working hours since it implies an out-
put increase similar to that of an otherwise cumber-
some accumulation of capital (Sinn 2004a, 2004b).
The increase in the volume of capital services pro-
duced by a given physical capital stock counteracts
the tendency to a fall in the productivity of a margin-
al hour when the working time of all employees
increases and thus makes a positive employment effect
much more likely (see Box 3.1). 
A special case of interest is when the operating time of
capital equals the working time of employees. This
holds when there is no shiftwork (or, more generally,
no overlapping of the working times of different
employees in order to lengthen operating time relative
to working time). In this case, the productivity of a
marginal hour is independent of working time: a
ceteris paribus change in working time changes the
amount of capital services (operating time x the phys-
ical capital stock) and the total amount of labour
(working time x the number of workers) proportion-
ally by as much and therefore leaves the ratio between
the amount of capital services and the total input of
labour unchanged. The productivity of a marginal
hour then depends only on the ratio between workers
and physical capital. Under these conditions, it fol-
lows that an increase in working time at unchanged
pay per worker must always raise employment: the
productivity of a marginal worker, to be set against
the constant pay, increases proportionally by as much
as working time. This happens already in the short
run without any need for restructuring of the capital
stock and adoption of new production methods.
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production function exhibits constant returns to scale: a, say, ten
percent increase in the inputs of both capital and labour (the total
number of hours worked) increases output also by ten percent.
Under this assumption, the marginal products of both labour
(hours) and capital depend only on the capital-labour ratio.EEAG Report 61
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Box 3.1
Some formulas for the short-run employment effects of longer working hours at unchanged pay per worker
If (1) a firm produces output with the help of (a fixed) capital (stock) and labour, (2) hours and workers are perfect
substitutes in production within the ranges of variation in hours and employment that are relevant, (3) there are no fixed costs 
of employment (costs that are fixed per worker independently of the length of working time), (4) there is a given output price
at which the firm can sell all that it produces, and (5) employment is determined by the demand for workers, the following
formula for the employment effect of an increase in working time at unchanged (nominal) pay per worker applies:
Percentage change in the number of workers = Percentage increase in working time x (Elasticity of labour demand with
respect to the hourly real product wage  –  1).
The elasticity of labour demand measures the percentage increase in total working hours demanded when the hourly real
product wage falls by one percent. The real product wage is the wage in units of the firm’s own output, that is the ratio
between the nominal wage and the output price. With a given output price, the percentage change in the nominal wage equals
the percentage change in the real product wage. 
The formula is easy to understand. If the hourly wage were held constant (which implies that the total number of hours
worked = employment x working time is also constant), then a one percent increase in working time would reduce
employment by one percent: a direct negative “work-sharing effect”. But when instead the lengthening of working time takes
place at unchanged pay per employee, a one percent increase in working time implies a one percent decrease in the hourly
wage. Hence, there is a percentage increase in the total number of hours worked which equals the elasticity of labour
demand. The percentage change in employment is obtained as the difference between the percentage increase in total hours
due to the fall in the hourly wage and the one percent reduction in employment that would occur at an unchanged hourly
wage.
When the operating time of capital depends on the working time of employees – so that the total amount of capital services
produced by the fixed capital stock increases when working time increases – and the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale, the change in employment following from an increase in working time at unchanged pay can be reformulated
as:
Percentage change in the number of workers = Percentage increase in working time x (Elasticity of labour demand with
respect to the hourly  real product wage  +  Elasticity of operating time of capital with respect to working time – 1).
The difference to the first formula arises because, with a constant-returns-to-scale production function, a one percent
increase in the volume of capital services increases the total number of working hours demanded also by one percent. The
percentage increase in the operating time following from a one percent increase in working time is given by the elasticity of
operating time with respect to working time. The larger is this elasticity, the greater is the probability of a positive
employment effect.
In the special case when the operating time of capital equals working time, the elasticity of operating time with respect to
working time is unity and the formula becomes:
Percentage change in the number of workers = Percentage increase in working time x Elasticity of labour demand with respect
to the hourly  real product wage.
In this case, an increase in working time at unchanged pay per worker always increases employment. The direct negative
“work-sharing effect” on the demand for workers of longer working time is exactly offset by an increase in demand
associated with the increase in the volume of capital services following from longer operating time. So, the only remaining
effect on employment is the increase that follows from the lower hourly wage.
The formulas above have rested on the assumption that the real pay of a worker in terms of the price of output produced is
unchanged when working time increases. If the output price is given, constant nominal pay also holds real pay constant. Most
firms cannot, however, sell an increase in output neither in domestic nor in world markets at an unchanged price. Instead,
prices must be lowered relative to competitors in order to gain market shares. Such a relative price decrease is indeed the
optimal response of a profit-maximising firm to a reduction in its relative wage cost vis-à-vis competitors. One has then to
distinguish between changes in the nominal and in the real product wage, as a given percentage reduction in the nominal wage
is associated with a smaller percentage reduction in the real product wage (the nominal wage deflated by the firm’s own
output price) when the output price falls, too.
An analysis of the employment effects of an increase in working time with constant nominal pay per worker in the case when
output prices fall, thus requires a slight change in the formulas: the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the real
product wage has to be multiplied by the elasticity of the real product wage with respect to the nominal wage (the percentage
reduction in the real product wage when the nominal wage falls by one percentage point). The latter elasticity is a positive
number below unity (but closer to unity, the closer substitutes in demand the outputs of different firms are). It follows that a 
higher elasticity of labour demand with respect to the real product wage is required for employment to rise when working
time is increased at constant nominal pay per worker when the output price is flexible than when it is fixed. The conclusion
that employment always increases when the operating time of capital equals the working time of employees still holds
however.Therefore, it pays unambiguously for the firm to hire
more workers. 
Working hours and the size of the capital stock
A second reason why an increase in working time at
unchanged pay could have a positive employment
effect already in the short run is that the physical cap-
ital stock may not be fixed, even over this time hori-
zon, but may respond to wages. Indeed, this is exactly
the case when employees are (credibly) threatened by
a closedown of the production site and an outsourc-
ing of jobs abroad unless wage costs are lowered.
Then the short-run wage elasticity of labour demand
is infinite, that is all jobs will disappear unless hourly
wages are cut. This is not, of course, the usual situa-
tion in most firms, but it will be the situation at some
firms at some points of time: for example, when a car
maker makes a “one-shot” decision on at which loca-
tion to invest in the production of new car models
that will replace older ones. Such one-shot investment
decisions seem indeed to have been part of the picture
in connection with some of the recent agreements on
longer working hours in Germany.
There is an additional advantage of an increase in
working time over a longer time horizon. As the out-
put increase that occurs with fixed pay per worker
implies an increase in profits, firms may accumulate
capital out of the retained earnings and expand their
capital stock faster than would otherwise be the case.
Other considerations
A full analysis needs to consider a number of addi-
tional aspects. One is the use of overtime. Economic
modelling explains the use of (paid) overtime with the
existence of fixed costs of employment, that is costs
per employee that are independent of the length of
working time (these include the daily set-up and clos-
ing-down costs as well as in-work benefits and costs
for training, human resource management, hiring,
and firing etc.). Employers have an incentive to
economise on these fixed costs through the use of
overtime. More exactly, employers trade off the reduc-
tion in hourly wage costs that can be achieved by
spreading the fixed employment costs over more
hours against the rise in costs associated with over-
time wage premia and the reduction in each worker’s
productivity per hour that will ultimately set in when
overtime increases. 
An increase in standard working time (above which
overtime premia are paid) reduces the cost of a mar-
ginal standard hour (provided by a marginal worker)
relative to the cost of a marginal overtime hour (pro-
vided by an intra-marginal worker), because fixed
employment costs are spread over more standard
hours. Employers then have an incentive to substitute
workers for overtime hours,14 which will add to the
positive employment effects arising from the incen-
tives to expand output when hourly wages fall. It is
difficult to evaluate how important these effects are.
Several studies have indicated that actual working
hours have fallen as much as standard hours when
earlier reductions in working time took place.15 On
the other hand, it appears, as discussed in Section 1.1,
that the difference between actual and standard work-
ing time is larger in countries and in sectors with
shorter working time.
Another complication is that the amount of shift-
work, or more generally the relationship between the
operating time of capital and the working time of
employees may be influenced by an increase in work-
ing time. According to Calmfors and Hoel (1989), an
increase in working time makes it profitable for
employers to substitute workers for shiftwork.
Yet another aspect is that different types of labour
may be complements in production. To the extent that
this is the case, an increase in working time of, say,
specialists who are in short supply may remove bott-
lenecks in production that increase the demand for
other types of labour.
A final consideration concerns the product demand
side. A frequently asked question is how a firm can
find the additional product demand to accommodate
an output increase in response to longer working
hours at unchanged pay per worker. In our stylised
examples with perfectly competitive product markets,
this additional demand would be automatically forth-
coming as each firm is so small that it could sell any
amount of output at the going market price. In a
more realistic setting, the firm would have to reduce
its output price relative to competitors in order to
gain a larger share of the market. Indeed, this would
be the profit-maximising response to the reduction in
the marginal production cost that takes place when
the hourly wage falls.
However, the need for a firm to cut prices in response
to an increase in working time is lower, the larger is
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14 See Calmfors and Hoel (1988).
15 This is the result in, for example, Hart and Sharot (1978), De Regt
(1988), Hunt (1999), and Kalwij and Gregory (1999). An exception
is Nordström Skans, who found that reductions in standard working
time for shift workers in Sweden had only a partial effect on actual
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the number of firms that simultaneously increase their
output. More output with given pay per worker
means higher profit incomes, and higher profit
incomes imply higher expenditure of firms and their
owners on other firms’products. In a closed economy,
prices on average might not have to fall at all in order
to accommodate the output increase, even though rel-
ative prices would have to change so as to match the
structure of additional demand with the structure of
additional output. But in an open economy, which
sells some of its products abroad and imports foreign
products, a decline in the relative product price vis-á-
vis other countries (a real exchange rate depreciation)
would be an inevitable and optimal response to the
increase in working time.
Summarising our discussion of the short-run effects
of longer working time at unchanged pay, it is clear
that the total number of hours worked, and thus also
output, increase. Whether or not the number of
employed workers also increases depends on the situ-
ation of the individual firm. When the alternative to
the agreements is a closing-down of production facil-
ities and an outsourcing of jobs abroad already in the
short run, the employment effects are by definition
positive. They are also positive in firms where this is
not the case, provided that an increase in working
time leads to a large enough increase in the utilisation
of the capital stock. But in other firms, the short-run
employment effects are likely to be negative.
3.2. Long-run effects of working hours on employment
and output
What would be the consequences for output and
employment in the long run of
an economy-wide increase in
working time? This question
requires an analysis of how both
wage-setting incentives and long-
run capital accumulation are
affected. 
The following analysis can serve
as a benchmark for thinking
about the issue. In the long run,
the return to capital in the inter-
national capital market ties down
the domestic return to capital in
any open economy. With capital
mobility, the capital stock in each
country adjusts over time until it
obtains the internationally deter-
mined rate of return (adjusted
for differences in risk among countries). If we, to
begin with, again assume a given degree of capital
utilisation, this in turn ties down the domestic hourly
real wage.16 The world market return to capital thus
determines the hourly real wage that is feasible in the
long run. A higher hourly wage than the feasible one
would result in a progressive reduction in the capital
stock, and a lower wage in a progressive increase. 
In long-run equilibrium, wage-setting behaviour has
to be consistent with the rate-of-return requirements
imposed by the international capital market.
Aggregate employment must be such that it gives the
parties in wage bargaining an incentive to choose the
feasible hourly wage. An analysis of the long-run
employment consequences of a change in working
hours should therefore focus on how wage-setting
behaviour is influenced (see, for example, Layard,
Nickell and Jackman 1991; Nickell and Layard 1999;
or Calmfors and Holmlund 2000). If, for example,
longer working time leads to less pressure to increase
hourly wages, lower unemployment is needed in equi-
librium to discourage wage setters from raising the
hourly wage above the feasible level.
Figure 3.5
16 The assumption of constant returns to scale in production is cru-
cial for this result. In long-run equilibrium, domestic firms use capi-
tal up to the point where the marginal product of capital is equal to
the real return to capital. Hence, a given real return to capital in the
world market determines the the ratio between labour (the total
number of hours worked = employment x working time) and capital
(as the marginal product of capital depends on this ratio). Labour is
used up to the point where the marginal product of labour (hours),
which also depends on the capital-labour ratio, equals the hourly real
wage. It follows that the internationally determined return to capital
also determines the hourly real wage. The requirement that the
domestic real return to capital (the nominal return deflated by the
output price) must equal the world market real return under perfect
capital mobility presupposes that domestic output prices follow for-
eign output prices, which is a reasonable benchmark in the long run.A diagrammatical analysis
The analytical framework is illustrated in Figure 3.5.
The axes of the diagram show the hourly real wage
and the number of employed workers, respectively.
The horizontal line shows the long-run feasible hourly
real wage, which is determined by the world market
return to capital. The line can also be interpreted as a
(completely elastic) long-run labour demand sched-
ule. It should be distinguished from the short-run
labour demand schedule, which is downward-sloping
and the position of which depends both on the length
of working time and the size of the capital stock
(which for the economy as a whole is fixed in the short
run).
The upward-sloping curve is a wage-setting schedule:
it shows how higher aggregate employment gives wage
setters an incentive to set a higher hourly wage
(because the bargaining position of employees in each
firm/sector is strengthened when there are more alter-
native employment opportunities available). The
intersection of the horizontal line, showing the feasi-
ble real wage, and the wage-setting schedule is the
long-run equilibrium. In the long run, the capital
stock adjusts, so that also the short-run labour
demand schedule passes through the intersection of
the other two schedules.
One can think of “globalisation” and EU enlarge-
ment as an increase in the required long-run return
to capital in Western Europe (and Germany),
because real capital investment overseas, yielding
higher returns, is now an option. This implies a
reduction in the feasible hourly real wage, that is a
downward shift in the horizontal line in Figure 3.5.
At the initial equilibrium at A, a discrepancy
between the domestic and the foreign returns to cap-
ital arises and capital is moved out. If the current
account was initially in balance, the capital outflow
is reflected in a current account surplus (as is now the
case for Germany and EU-15). This shifts the short-
run labour demand schedule gradually to the left. As
a consequence, the hourly wage falls.17 This process
continues until the capital stock has fallen so much
that a new equilibrium is reached at B, where the
domestic and foreign returns to capital are again
equal. At B both employment and capital stock are
lower than in the original equilibrium. Therefore
output is also lower.18
Suppose now that working time increases in response
to the fall in the feasible hourly wage. How would this
affect the long-run equilibrium? In our example, the
increase in working time has no repercussions on the
feasible hourly wage, as this is uniquely determined by
the international return to capital. Therefore, the
long-run effect on equilibrium employment depends
only on how the wage-setting schedule is affected. If it
is left unchanged, equilibrium employment is unaf-
fected. The effect will then simply be that the capital
stock and output increase proportionally by as much
as working time (compared to what would otherwise
be the case).19 If the wage-setting schedule shifts
downwards, equilibrium employment increases rela-
tive to the situation in B. This implies an increase in
output that is proportionally larger than the increase
in working time. If the wage-setting schedule instead
shifts upwards, equilibrium employment is reduced
and output increases proportionally less than working
time and may even fall.
There will be a one-to-one correspondence between
the effects of a change in working time on wage-set-
ting incentives and on long-run equilibrium employ-
ment only if the degree of capital utilisation is not
affected. The analysis becomes slightly more compli-
cated if we, as in Section 3.1, take into account that
longer working time may also increase the operating
time of the capital stock. The reason is that such an
increase would raise the feasible hourly wage. The
intuition is straightforward. If there is an internation-
ally required return to (physical) capital, an increase
in the operating time of capital reduces the cost of
capital services (the cost per operating hour of the
capital stock). This makes it profitable for firms to use
more capital services relative to labour. Such a more
capital-intensive production raises the productivity of
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17 A more elaborate anlaysis would distinguish between different cat-
egories of workers. It is then quite likely that only the wage of
unskilled workers falls, whereas the wage of skilled workers could
rise. See the discussion of outsourcing in Chapter 2.
18 If a fall in employment is to be avoided, the wage-setting schedule
must shift downwards by a sufficient amount. A downward shift
occurs, for example, if unemployment benefits are reduced, as this
makes unemployment more unattractive and hence provides a
stronger incentive for wage restraint. Such a reduction in the benefit
level takes place automatically if benefits are indexed to wages. The
output decrease associated with the movement from A to B in the
diagram should be interpreted in a comparative-static sense only. In
a growing economy, output at the time the economy has moved to B
might be higher than at the time the economy was in A, but it would
be lower than would be the case without a fall in the feasible real
wage. 
19 The hourly real wage given by the lower horizontal line in Figure
5 has to equal the marginal product of labour (hours), which
depends on the ratio between capital and the total amount of labour
(working time x employment). Longer working time at constant
employment implies a larger total amount of labour. Hence, the cap-
ital stock has to increase by proportionally as much to keep the mar-
ginal product of labour equal to the given hourly wage. Thus, for
example, ten percent longer working time implies ten percent higher
total labour input and hence also ten percent higher capital stock in
equilibrium than would otherwise be the case. Then output must also
be ten percent higher. See, for example, Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991) and Konjunkturinstitutet (2000).EEAG Report 65
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the marginal working hour and thus makes a higher
hourly wage consistent with equilibrium in the inter-
national capital market. If this occurs – so that the
horizontal line in Figure 3.5 shifts upwards again – an
increase in working time would have a positive effect
on long-run equilibrium employment also in the case
of an unchanged wage-setting schedule.
Theoretical analysis of working time and wage-setting
incentives
Our discussion above has shown that the long-run
employment effect of longer working hours depends
critically on how wage-setting incentives (in terms of
the choice of hourly wages) are affected. What do we
know about this? Theoretical analysis has pointed to
a number of reasons why an increase in working time
could give incentives for wage moderation.20
• With longer working hours, employees can attain a
given total wage income with a lower hourly wage.
• Since longer hours at a constant hourly wage
would be associated with higher wage income, they
tend to make employment more favourable to the
individual employee as compared to unemploy-
ment. This works in the direction of making
unions more concerned about preserving jobs and
therefore provides an incentive for them to accept
lower hourly wages.
• An increase in working time increases the share of
variable wage costs (wages paid in proportion to
working time) relative to fixed costs per employee
in total labour costs. This makes both employment
and profits more sensitive to increases in the hourly
wage. Hence, the costs of a wage rise in terms of
lower employment (for unions) and lower profits
(for employers) increase. As a consequence, there
are incentives on both sides of the labour market
to choose lower hourly wages.
• Firms may be using high wages as a device to
enhance the efficiency of the labour force, for
example to discourage quits and in this way keep
down hiring and training costs that reduce work-
ers’ net productivity. By increasing output per
worker, longer working hours may weaken the
incentive of employers to set high hourly wages for
such efficiency-enhancing reasons.
However, the literature has also identified effects
through which longer working hours tend to strength-
en the incentives for high hourly wages:
• Longer hours mean more disutility from work,
which works in the direction of making employ-
ment less favourable to the individual union mem-
ber as compared to unemployment. This tends to
make unions less concerned about jobs and thus
provides an incentive for higher hourly wages on
their part.
• Longer working time per employee also means that
the reduction in the number of working hours
demanded caused by a rise in the hourly wage is
associated with a smaller fall in the number of jobs.
This reduces the price of wage increases in terms of
lost jobs and thus weakens union incentives for
wage restraint.  
As there are counteracting effects, theoretical analysis
cannot give a clear-cut answer to how changes in
working time affect wage-setting incentives. The con-
clusions depend on the exact assumptions made,
although there seems to be a bias in the theoretical
research towards the conclusion that longer working
hours lead to more wage restraint, in which case long-
run equilibrium employment must increase. There is
also a presumption that this outcome is more likely,
the lower is working time initially.
Empirical analysis of working time and wage-setting
incentives
There has also been a fair amount of empirical
research on the effects of changes in working time on
wage setting.
Several studies have included working time as an
explanatory variable in wage equations estimated on
macroeconomic time series data. Such studies include
among others Pencavel and Holmlund (1988) for
Sweden, Nymoen (1989) for Norway, Calmfors and
Nymoen (1990) for Denmark, Norway and Sweden,
Lehment (1991) and Franz and Smolny (1994) for
Germany, and Dur (1997) for the Netherlands. All of
these studies, with the exception of Lehment, find that
longer working hours co-vary with lower hourly
wages.21 A problem with these studies, however, is that
the strong trends in both wages (upwards) and work-
ing time (downwards) over the estimation periods can
make the results unreliable.
More emphasis should be placed on a few later stud-
ies that have used panel data, that is data with both
time-series and cross-section variability. Hunt (1999)
20 The theoretical literature includes contributions by, for example,
Calmfors (1985, 1987), Hoel and Vale (1986), Holmlund (1987),
Booth and Schiantarelli (1987), Booth and Ravaillon (1993), Houpis
(1993), Marimon and Zilibotti (2000), and Nordström Skans (2002).
21 Note, however, that Nymoen (1989) and Calmfors and Nymoen
(1990) found only short-run but no long-run effects.estimated wage equations for individual employees in
Germany, making use of the fact that both the timing
and extent of working time reductions in the 1980s
and early 1990s differed between sectors. Nordström
Skans (2002) exploited instead the fact that working
time was cut only for (some types of) shift workers in
manufacturing and mining in Sweden in the 1980s,
but not for other workers. Kapteyn, Kalwij, and Zaidi
(2000) instead estimated wage equations for a panel of
OECD countries. All three studies come up with very
similar results, implying an elasticity of hourly wages
with respect to working time of around – 1. This
means that an increase in working time by one percent
tends to lower hourly wages also by one percent. Put
differently, the implication is that a working time
increase – everything else equal – would leave total
pay per worker more or less unchanged, as in the
recent company-level agreements in Germany.
The empirical research described thus supports the
view that working time increases contribute to sub-
stantial reductions in wage pressure. This gives a
strong presumption that longer working hours do
indeed have long-run positive effects on employment.
At the same time, a caveat is in place. The estimated
wage equations are all in a sense partial-equilibrium
analyses, which raises the – theoretical – possibility
that a full general-equilibrium analysis could give
other results.22
Some partial-equilibrium empirical results on the
direct relationship between employment and working
time also imply a presumption that longer working
hours may help create more jobs when the effects on
wage-setting behaviour are taken into account. When
estimating reduced-form employment equations for a
panel of industries in Germany, Hunt (1999) in many
specifications found shorter working hours to reduce
employment (for men) significantly. Kapteyn, Kalwij,
and Zaidi (2000) found a negative, but insignificant,
long-run effect on employment of working time
reductions in their panel of OECD countries when
wage effects were taken into account. According to
Crépon and Kramarz (2002), using microeconomic
data for individual employees in France, there was a
higher unemployment incidence among workers who
were affected by the 1982 reduction of the working
week than among those who were not.
4. Conclusions
Both hours worked per capita and hours worked per
employee are low in several continental European
countries, such as Germany, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands, as compared to the US. This accounts
for a large part of the income difference between
Western Europe and the US. The low working hours
in Europe reflect to a large extent low standard work-
ing hours for full-time employees.
Recent company-level deals in Germany on longer
working time may represent a reversal of the earlier
trend towards shorter working time that could spread
also to other Western European countries with low
working hours. It seems that especially the French dis-
cussion has been very much affected by the working
time developments in Germany, but also employer
demands in Belgium and the Netherlands have been
influenced.23
The recent working-time agreements in Germany have
implied longer working hours with no, or only partial,
compensation and have thus reduced hourly wages.
The deals can be seen as cost-cutting measures made
necessary by both increased international competition
in goods markets and credible employer threats to
outsource jobs abroad associated with the on-going
“globalisation” in general and EU enlargement in
particular.
One way of thinking about the deals on longer work-
ing time is as a convenient way of reducing hourly
wages without reducing the pay per employee. Indeed,
this was an important argument in the German dis-
cussion that anticipated these deals, However, one can
also view them as a labour supply response in collec-
tive agreements to a required reduction in the hourly
wage, brought about by the forces of globalisation.
The desired working time on the part of trade unions
is likely to respond differently to a wage change than
the desired working time on the part of employees
when acting on their own. When the hourly wage falls,
the ordinary substitution effect – which tends to
reduce desired working time – is counteracted by a
weakening of union incentives to restrict working
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22 For example, the empirical studies discussed do not take into
account that the level of unemployment benefits is likely in the long
run to adjust to the aggregate pay level of employed workers. This
will happen, for example, if the replacement rate (the ratio of the
unemployment benefit to the pay of an employed worker) is fixed
and thus is not affected by a change in average working time. In this
case, it is theoretically possible that an increase in working time in an
individual firm only would reduce wages there, at the same time as
an economy-wide increase in working time would reduce aggregate
equilibrium employment. This can, for example, occur in the model
of Nordström Skans (2002).
23 Recently, for example, the French government has increased the
ceiling for overtime from 180 to 220 hours per year. A new law also
permits employers and enmployees to agree on overtime hours in
excess of the legal ceiling.EEAG Report 67
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hours in order to promote employment. This weaken-
ing occurs because the value for a union member of
having a job is smaller if the wage is lower. Under
some theoretical assumptions, the response of desired
working time on the part of a union is governed by an
income effect only. If so, it is in the interest of unions
to increase working time if hourly wages have to fall. 
When analysing the employment and output effects of
longer working hours, it is essential to distinguish
between the short run and the long run. Already in
the short run, longer working hours at unchanged pay
will by definition prevent job losses in firms where
there is an acute risk of outsourcing production
because costs are too high. Also in firms where this is
not the case, such agreements will have positive
employment effects, provided that longer working
time of employees leads to a large enough increase in
the utilisation of capital (because the capital stock can
be operated for more hours). Indeed, such an increase
in capital utilisation is one of the major advantages of
longer working hours. However, in other firms where
the operating time of capital cannot be increased and
where it may take time to adopt new production
methods, the employment effects are likely to be neg-
ative in the short run. Lower wages per hour will,
however, always make it profitable for firms to expand
output.
In the long run, the hourly real wage level in an open
economy must be such that capital earns the same rate
of return as abroad. It follows that the long-run feasi-
ble hourly wage depends on the world market rate of
return to capital. A critical factor for the long-run
employment effects of an economy-wide lengthening
of working hours is therefore how wage-setting incen-
tives are affected. If longer working time creates
stronger incentives for wage moderation, lower unem-
ployment is needed in equilibrium to discourage
wages from rising above the feasible level. Although
neither theoretical nor empirical research gives unam-
biguous conclusions, there is a presumption that
longer working hours would contribute to wage mod-
eration. If so, one should expect positive employment
effects in the long run from longer working time. This
would then add to the positive long-run output effects
of an increase in working time that would arise
already at an unchanged employment level. 
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